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Aristotle'sCritiqueof Mimesis:
The RomanticPrelude
TERRYLL. GIVENS

The most notable element of Plato's theory of art, or at least the most
memorable, is his censorship of poetry from the ideal state (RepublicIII:
398; X: 607). However Plato's argument is construed, it is enlightening to
note the domestication to which it is invariablysubjected. Since Aristotle's
theory is eminently more amenable to our contemporary appreciation for
art, and, in one form or another, is judged more central to the history of
Western literature, Plato's attack is dispensed with after due characterization as ironic,1 unmanageably ambiguous,2 valid only in a most limited
context,3 or excusable in the light of the extraordinarycircumstancespeculiar to Plato's profession, day, and society (his philosophic loyalties,4didacticism as a norm,5 and the decadence of Athenian literature).6 Now we
could dispense with the assertions that his ban was an ironic gesture or
innocuously hypothetical by pointing out that while the Republic Plato
envisioned, in earnest or not, was never realized, the attack on art he
espoused was tangible enough in its repercussions.And as for the argument
that the extraordinarycircumstances of Plato's day preclude the validity of
the theory it fostered, it must be rememberedthat later philosophers were
not indifferent to the role of art in man's moral and intellectual development, classical Athens was far from the least aesthetically sophisticated of
societies, and literatureof that period was neither significantlymore subversive nor more edifying than our own. (And obviously these circumstances
did not predetermine the conclusions of Plato's famous student. )
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But rather than address these attempts to neutralize Plato's objections
to art, we might with profit ask why such an impulse has been so persistent and so powerful, and how this tendency may have significantly
conditioned our understanding of important chapters in the history of
aesthetics. Plato's condemnation of poetry rests upon his equation of art
with imitation and his assessment of the inherent failings - metaphysical
and ethical - of art-as-mimesis. Thus, when Plato's attack on art is dismissed, his impact on the mimetic tradition is minimized or dismissed ipso
facto. This move therefore makes possible a condition that, given the long
and complex history of mimesis, is a dubious state of affairs.
The prominence of the principle of mimesis in Western literature and
critical history amounts to what John Boyd has called "twenty-three centuries of ...
hegemony."7 This lengthy hegemony would seem to presupthe
pose
enduring vitality of a fairly constant, coherent concept. But such
a monolithic characterization of critical history would clash with an admittedly diverse - radically diverse - array of concepts at times only
obliquely related under the rubric of "mimesis."8 The solution has been to
assign one of those significations commanding authority - and it is not
Plato's.
In the only full-length treatment of mimesis in the English language,
Boyd argues that the mimetic tradition is largely the history of a concept
that is grossly misunderstood and misinterpreted, amounting finally to an
utter "decay in the critical understanding of mimesis."9 In spite of the fact
that mimesis has a history predating Plato and continuing to the present,
Boyd does articulate a suprahistorical definition: the Aristotelian. Mimesis is the probable rendered into structure. He complains that this
structure-grounded meaning is replaced, by the late eighteenth century,
by an attenuated mimesis that comes to assume a "time-place context of
meaning." By this "empirical and superficial notion of mimesis" he means
an emphasis on the representational aspect rather than the cognitive
element. 10Boyd is certainly not the first to see the history of this concept
as the corruption of Aristotelian mimesis. In his learned study of
eighteenth-century mimesis John Draper chronicles the two "false meanings [which] passed current in England as vulgate Aristotelianism": "one
making it a copy of actions and things, the other a copy of accepted
masterpieces."11 Even earlier, Irving Babbitt described how, "while claiming to follow Aristotle, these [neo-classicist] theorists really became
pseudo- Aristotelian. "12
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This dominance of the Aristotelian paradigm is problematic because a
position that simultaneously asserts the centrality and the corruption of
Aristotelian mimesis runs the risk of blurring questions of history and
semantics, of confusing descriptive and prescriptive aesthetics. I would
suggest that the vital interrelationship of literary theory and literary history may be better illuminated by shifting attention to the dynamics of
that theory which initiated the mimetic tradition rather than tracing the
decline of what might have proved a more enduring centerpiece of literary
theory, the Aristotelian art-as-the-probable.
By reasserting the primacy of the Platonic paradigm, it becomes possible to see the Aristotelian response for what it more properly is: not an
alternative to Platonic mimesis, but rather a critique of the possibility of
mimesis itself in any meaningful sense. As I hope to suggest, the
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century dismantling of mimesis which we
call Romanticism is no more than the rendering explicit and specific of
what in Aristotle's critique is embryonic.
Aristotle's name writ large in the history of mimesis obscures the implications of his discussion not being the first, nor ultimately the most influential. (That Aristotelian mimesis is not central to the mimetic tradition is
tacitly acknowledged in any account of apostasy from the Aristotelian
position, like Boyd's, Draper's,and Babbitt's.) Of course even though Plato
was the first to use the word in an extended discussion of art, even he was
appropriatinga term with a well-established meaning. As H. Koller writes,
Dabei ergab sich, daB ui|Aï]aiç "Nachahmung"bedeuten Jcann,daB
das Wort aber im iibrigen ein ganz anderes Bedeutungsfeld besitzt
als die Ausdrùcke "Nachahmung", "imitatio". Sein Bedeutungszentrum liegt im Tanz. \ii\u\otc heiBt primàr: durch Tanz zur
Darstellung bringen.
[The result was that |U|xr|Oiçcan mean "imitation," but that the
word otherwise has a semantic range entirely apart from the terms
"imitation," "imitatio."Its central meaning lies in dance, \ii\ir\oic,
means primarily:to effect a representation through dance.]13
This is not to say that philological origins are determinative of a word's
"true meaning." It is to say that if neoclassical conceptions of mimesis as
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"empirical" or as "copy of actions" are considered naive and superficial,
good precedent exists. Plato, of course, is at times still very close to this
root context of mime or dance, as when he refers to the two fundamental
styles of poetry as simple narration and impersonation (which he calls
mimesis); hence his appellation of poets as "pantomimic gentlemen" (Republic III: 398). H And Plato's treatment of mimesis is not one that Aristotle's simply supplanted.
Plato's treatment - and condemnation - of art included a challenge
that subsequent critics could not possibly resist: "let us assure our sweet
friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title
to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her"
(X:607). The unacceptability of Plato's mimesis-centered theory of art
meant that Aristotle's poetics was a rebuttal before it was a proposal.
Plato, of course, was the first to transpose this term to the poetic arts in
something approaching systematic fashion. We must not forget this fact,
since Aristotle, before he can articulate a new vision of the nature and
function of poetry, must first address head-on the Platonic attack on art,
that is, on art-as-mimesis. Aristotle's discussion of mimesis is, therefore,
ab initio a critique of (Platonic) mimesis. It seems most reasonable, hence,
to at least consider Aristotle not as "the originator of the imitative fallacy,"15 but as its first critic. And the possibility is now advanced that the
collapse of mimesis in the eighteenth century is the working out of an
Aristotelian critique of mimesis, rather than an abandonment or distortion of Aristotelianism.
As Gerald Else remarks, mimesis is the "master-concept" of the Poetics. 16His daunting study is largely the anatomy of the "drastic revision" of
Plato's concept by Aristotle, which revision, he argues, constitutes "in
effect a new theory."17 But if Plato's version of mimesis led him to condemn art as immoral, deceptive, and unphilosophic, and Aristotle's revised theory entailed no such conclusions, then we need to locate the
point of departure, and how Aristotle manages to disarm the Platonic
argument. It will here prove helpful to outline the essential features of a
theoretical model for mimesis, in light of which we may frame our comparative analysis of Plato and Aristotle.
Reducing the principle of mimesis to its essential elements, we find that
whether we interpret the term as imitation, representation, copying, mimicking, etc., three things are constant: an object of representation, which
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we may call the model, the product of representation, or the presented
object, and some relation of likeness that obtains between them. It has
been traditional to characterize mimetic theories according to variations
in the first constant alone, the model; imitation is of the ancients (Horace), of nature's entelechy (Aristotle), or of surface appearances (Plato).
Such an approach distorts Plato, obviates Aristotle's critique of Plato, and
misdirects the study of eighteenth-century mimesis and its decline.
First, the case of Plato. It is simply reductive and inaccurate to equate
Plato's mimesis with copying of superficial appearances. Certainly this
view is indicated in his bed analogy. But at other times he refers to the
imitation of virtues and character traits (Rep. Ill: 395) or even to nonexistent hypothetical entities or "patterns," as in his discussion with
Glaucon:
Would a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man,
he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed?
He would be none the worse.
Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State? (Rep.

V: 472)
J. Ta te argues convincingly that at least on some occasions Plato uses
mimesis to refer to the use of a "divine paradigm," in which the "ideal
world" is imitated.18Boyd, as well, acknowledges that in The Laws Plato
"admiredan ideal poetry, which sought to reveal the forms, the perfection
of human life as it should be lived."19(These last two judgments would
diminish considerably the distance separating Plato's "superficialcopying"
from Aristotle's mimesis as a structure with universal significance.)
The real question, however, is not "what elements of Plato's theory of
art-as-mimesiswill render it most justifiable, most redeemable?"but rather
"what aspect of mimesis leads Plato to condemn art?"At least, the latter is
the dilemma that Aristotle inherited, and that his or any revisionarytheory
of art would have to address. It has been widely argued that it is precisely
those times when imitation is of superficial appearances only that Plato
condemns art,20and that Aristotle dispensed with this problem by redefining mimesis in terms of the model.21 However, if we examine various
contexts for Plato's attack on art, we see that the common denominator in
his examples is not to be found in the model. Three examples will suffice.
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If we confine ourselves to the discussion of art in the Republic, we may
summarize Plato's objections to mimesis as either ethical or metaphysical.
On the one hand, Plato argues in book III that imitation may corrupt by
providing accounts that, however accurate, are inappropriate models of
conduct. Neither the horror of death and "the world below," nor excessive levity, nor lasciviousness are "meet for the ears of boys and men who
are meant to be free" (III: 387). After dealing with the negative consequences of such poetic subjects, Plato turns to a critique of what he sees as
the detriments of imitative style. Personation, the enactment of alien
personalities and actions, is condemned because 1) "no one man can
imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one" and 2) the
youth of Athens "should not depict or be skillful at imitating any kind of
illiberality or baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what
they imitate" (394-5).
In book X, on the other hand, Plato turns to his metaphysical or
ontological critique of imitative art. Plato considers only the ideal to be
"true existence" (X: 601), and he faults art for its being thrice removed
from this ideal, as the bed analogy demonstrates. A close look at this
discussion reveals that for Plato an artistic representation does not "fall
short" of the ideal, as much as it distorts it by what it adds. This fact is
implicit in Plato's explanation of the uniqueness of the ideal in terms of a

tertiumcomparationisargument:
God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in
nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever
have been nor ever will be made by God.
Why is that?
Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear
behind them which both of them would have for their idea, and
that would be the ideal bed and not the two others. (X: 597)
What this means is that any two objects exhibiting any relationship of
likeness will always imply a third object, with respect to which they are
similar. This third object would therefore be essentially similar to the two
objects, but would differ in leaving only potential what they render actual, thereby establishing their identity and difference. But what this
statement further implies is that an ideal object (Plato's Idea) will always
be distinguished from any concrete manifestation or replica thereof, by
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virtue of that ideal object's state of potentiality. To renderan ideal particular is therefore inevitably to actualize some of its potential features, while
inevitably leaving some undetermined. An artistic representation, therefore, is always distinguished from the ideal not only because it confines
itself to the presentation of a phenomenal aspect of the ideal, but because
it particularizesit, and thus concretizes or actualizes variables only latent
in the model.
Ironically, art is also condemned for falling short of the physical. Plato's
idealism leads us to assume that art, being the product of physical mediation and therefore at two removes from the eidos, or "true existence," is
condemned for this remoteness.22 But that would be to oversimplify
Plato's scheme. That more is at stake emerges from Plato's question to
Glaucon about the carpenter: " 'is not he also the makerof the bed?' 'Yes.'
'But would you call the painter a ... maker?''Certainly not' " (X: 597).
Both God and carpenters may be called "makers,"while the painter may
not. Why, if the bed is clearly a particularizationof the ideal just as the
painting is? Because the carpenter'sbed, regardlessof its not being "a real
object" ("he cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of
existence"- 597), is sufficiently distinct from its model to be free from
the charge of deceptiveness. Moreover, its existence and subsistence are
dependent upon an independent function (reclining) which furtherdistinguishes it from its ideal model. It therefore constitutes a distinct, autonomous object. The painting, on the other hand, "is designed to be- an
imitation of things ... as they appear." With imitation as its end, its
existence and subsistence are model-dependent. And if its end is
achieved, "if he is a good painter, [the artist] may deceive" (598).
This deception is in fact inevitably realized to some degree, if not fully,
as the result of the transformation of a physical model via a representational medium and into a presented object. In making this criticism, Plato
must raise an objection that is the virtual converse of the problem we
have seen with rendering the ideal into art (the particularizationof the
essential, the making actual of the potential). When the model is physical, the artist will unavoidably produce an object that leaves schematic
and indeterminate that which in the model is fully determinate and
actualized.23Still in the context of the bed analogy, Plato relates this
weakness to the deceptive nature of human perception itself: "you may
look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from
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any other point of view, and the bed will appear different, but there is no
difference in reality" (X: 598). Similarly, an artist can do no more than to
"lightly touch ... on a small part of [the model]" (X: 598). It is the fact
that art emulates this perspectival limitation, and not art's degree of ontic
remove from the ideal, which is the essence of this stage in the critique.
Art thus falls into a double bind, in that it is condemned with specific
relation to both the ideal and the physical for opposite reasons.
In this discussion of the bed analogy, then, the bed is at one remove
from the ideal, but carpenters are not therefore vilified. Neither carpenters nor painters are faulted strictly in terms of their position per se in a
metaphysical hierarchy. Rather, each is evaluated according to its relation to its presumed model. In the case of representational art, we may
now call that relationship one of pseudo- identity. Even in this, the most
philosophical of Plato's objections, the bottom line is ethical, not ontological: "if he is a good painter, he may deceive." Not, it must be emphasized, because he falls into deceitfulness, but as a consequence of practicing his art well.
We have now arrived at the crux of Plato's critique of mimetic art.
Whether his condemnation is considered to be ontological, didactic, or
moral, his arguments have one essential feature in common, but only one.
They presume neither a common model (it may be historical, physical, or
ideal) nor a common medium (poetry or painting). But all are predicated
upon a criticism of art's effects, art's fearful power. This power inheres
neither in the model nor in the presented object itself, but in the illusory
potential of that relationship which joins and confuses them. It is the
potential for this paramount degree of likeness or correspondence, for a
misguided identification of model with presented object, which is the sine
qua non of Platonic mimesis.
Obviously, this confusion of the work of art with the model cannot be
taken to mean that a bird will attempt to eat a poem about fruit, in the
same way that hungry birds were said to attack the canvases of the legendary Zeuxis. Or, in Plato's terms, a painting of a bed may "deceive at a
distance," but a poem about one will not.
Roman Jakobson has already raised this objection:
While in painting and in the other visual arts the illusion of an
objective and absolute faithfulness to reality is conceivable, "natu-
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ral" (in Plato's terminology), verisimilitude in a verbal expression
or in a literary description makes no sense whatever.24
I would argue that, on the contrary, any time representational art acts
upon us so as to elicit responses appropriate to the model it imitates,
illusion, i.e., effectual displacement in our consciousness of the representation by the model, has occurred. Plato obviously concurred that the
delusory implications of mimesis were not substantially different from
medium to medium.
This pseudo-identity is the most important feature of Plato's discussion
of mimesis (as it will prove to be pivotal in the concept's history and
demise), and one that has received scant attention. This is the more
significant, considering that mimesis is generally defined, its various usages differentiated, on the basis of the object imitated (is it antiquity, the
classics, nature, life?). The constant in Plato's several remarkson mimesis, and the feature that determines his condemnation of the imitative
arts, is the confusion of the model with the presented object. Whether we
choose to locate that confusion in audience misperception, leading to
undesirable consequences (and thus enable a reading of Plato's ban as
ironic, given his ability to differentiate), or whether we attribute that
confusion to Plato's insistence that art is, in its most fundamental dimension, imitative, does not immediately matter. Because the false teaching,
the emotional debilitation, and the metaphysical shortcomings all depend
for their ill-effects upon an unrestrainedpotential for art to function in an
illusory way, for the representational medium to fade into transparency,
the presented object to feign the authenticity of the model, for difference
to masqueradeas sameness.
If this is true, then Aristotle's challenge is clear. He must address
neither the appropriatenessof the model nor the effects of the presented
object, but rather the degree of likeness that can conceivably obtain
between them, the limits of semblance that are possible, for therein lies
the key to the condemnation or the rehabilitation of art-as-mimesis.
Certainly it would be easiest for Aristotle to simply bypass the Platonic
objections to art. He could do this by arguing that art is not mimesis, not
an attempt to replicate a model, but an object sui generis,to be judged on
its own merits. Or he could argue that mimesis is properlyunderstood in a
far less restrictive sense than Plato, thus freeing art from the demand that
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it conform in every particular to the model on which it is based. While
both of these points may be seen as implicit in the position Aristotle
articulates, by themselves they fail to address the objectionability of art's
seductive verisimilitude that is the heart of Plato's complaint.
It is the nature of that correspondence between real world and "realistic" art on which Plato's condemnation of art hinges, and to which
Aristotle first directs himself. He therefore begins with Plato's premise
that the various arts are, indeed, essentially characterized as forms of
imitation (jrâoai xvyxàvovoiv ovoai \i\ir\OEic,to ovvoXov [1447a 1516]).25And then Aristotle immediately addressesthe charge that it is the
appeal of art, its seductive power to please while corrupting by causing us
to confound illusion with reality, that calls for art's condemnation. In
chapter 4 of the Poetics Aristotle, in analyzing the sources of aesthetic
pleasure, undermines this Platonic objection and the mimetic principle it
presumes:"Objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to
contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity" (1448b). Aristotle is
here alluding to an instance of the principle of aesthetic distance. This
remark is a surprisinglysimple indication of Plato's failed critique. For in
the example Aristotle cites, the unpleasant experience of beholding a
corpse is transformed through a representational medium, into the pleasant experience of apprehending its representation. Clearly, the object of
apperception is not the same in the two cases. Consequently, the imitative intention (to present an unpleasant subject matter) is utterly
thwarted.
This product of imitation (which I will call "representation,"as distinct
from the activity, "imitation"26)exhibits characteristics, in fact, an entire
ontology, quite distinct from and independent of its model. It is a distinction dramatically emphasized by divergent experiences of the model and
of its representation, a divergence not anticipated in the notion of imitation itself. The relation of model to presented object can never, therefore,
transcend mere approximation. And this is not an approximation sufficient to elicit the consequences so deplored by Plato.
Aristotle's theory of catharsis may be seen as further corroboration of
Aristotle's insistence on the inescapability of aesthetic distance and its
corollary: imitation may legitimately be considered as motivational or
causal, but never as descriptive of the quiddity of art itself, since the
distinction between model and product is not accidental but fundamental. The ugliness of the corpse is not diluted; it is displaced by a quality
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which evokes pleasure. Similarly, in the case of catharsis,27emotional
benefits are seen to accrue from the depiction of tragedyand horror. Such
an effect would require that audience identification with the flawed characters stop short of emulation or emotional confusion. These errors can
only be avoided if at some point in the viewing of the spectacle, detachment occurs to turn emotional seduction into moral betterment (in a
manner analogous to the transformation of a corpse's ugliness into aesthetic pleasure).
And finally, Aristotle again confirms that imitation is inessential as a
characteristic of art when he discusses the antlered doe. In chapter 25, he
reaffirmsand reemphasizes the threads of his anti-mimetic critique.28He
concedes the place of imitation in the creative process as one that combines a universal impulse to mimic with an unrestricted range of models.
The artist "must imitate . . . things as they were or are, things as they are
said or thought to be, or things as they ought to be" (1460b). He immediately proceeds to disabuse his audience of false conclusions about the
propriety of judging the products of such imitations in accordance with
the Platonic model. Neither ethics ("the standardof correctness is not the
same in poetry and politics" [1460b]) nor fidelity to a model is an appropriate standard. To illustrate the latter point, Aristotle uses an extreme case.
A doe neither has, is said to have, nor ought to have antlers. If an artist
inadvertently renders them in a painting (through "wrong choice" or
"technical inaccuracy"), then we have a blatant discrepancy between the
model (whether it was real or ideal) and the presented object, and a prime
candidate for Plato's objections. Here Aristotle underscoreshis break with
Plato, by emphasizing that such a failing pertains not to what "touches the
essence" of art, but to what is "accidental"to it: "not to know that a hind
has no horns is a less serious matter than to paint it inartistically"
(1460b). Platonic imitation, whereby art is evaluated according to the
integrity of its product, i.e., its correspondence to originary model, is
adjudgedneither a sufficient nor even a necessary condition for successful
art. This critique must be seen as predicated upon an already demonstrated disjunction between the imitative process and the independent
representation as product. Aesthetic distance is evidence of a paradigm
that is inappropriatebecause it is impossible. We might say that for Plato,
art is condemned because it imitates so well without imitating perfectly.
For Aristotle, art is redeemed because it cannot imitate that well after all,
and so imitates artistically.
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If the foregoing is true, then it is not sufficient to say, as does Else, that
in Aristotle's hands mimesis is transformed into "a really new idea."29 For
it is essential to Aristotle's purposes methodically and systematically to
remove mimesis from its central position in literary theory. Plato's objections were simply not controvertible by reintroducing more appropriate
models or expanding the concept of imitation to allow more freedom. The
problem, as we have seen, was in the degree of likeness implied by the
very concept of imitation, and which if admitted as a perennial possibility, doomed art to perennial suspicion and censure. So Aristotle had to
wrench the work of art free from the tyranny of a model it could never
successfully emulate. And this independence of the presented object is
simply not reconcilable with mimesis in any meaningful sense (other than
as descriptive of the origin or process of artistic creation). But to remove
mimesis as the essential characterization of the work of art is simultaneously to remove the grounds of aesthetic quality, since pleasure can no
longer be predicated upon the features of the model imitated ("if you
happen not to have seen the original, the pleasure will be due not to the
imitation as such, but to the execution, the colouring, or some such other
cause" [1448b]).
Aristotle knows that an alternate theory of the grounding of aesthetic
quality is required of his poetics, and is in fact already indicated in the
observation that pleasure accrues from depiction of unpleasant subjects.
In such a case, the aesthetic quality of a work obviously cannot derive
from the model or evocation of the model. The enjoyment which Aristotle notes must obtain in spite of the accuracy of representation, not
because of it. For the nearer a representation comes to replace mere
resemblance with the illusion of identity, the more our experience of the
representation would approximate our experience of the reality. Hence,
the more accurate the painting, the more illusional, the more it should
repel us (if a base object). But in art, just the reverse proves to be the case.
Our negative response to reality has been displaced by a positive response
to a semblance. Evidently, then, a representation's accuracy, its impulse
toward illusion, is opposed by a deeper aesthetic dimension which pleases
only by a transformation, not replication, of its object, creating in the
process new (aesthetic) qualities.
This aesthetic grounding, of course, is precisely the function of Aristotle's mythos. His working out of this element of tragedy is framed in
terms orchestrated to fill the void left by a dismantled mimesis. Mythos is
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defined in three essential ways, all of which emphatically assert its role as
grounding aesthetic quality; organic unity, the probable impossible, and
the self-determination of beginning, middle, and end, are all means
whereby the work as a thing made is freed from any essential reliance
upon or reference to an external model.
The irony in the mimetic tradition is that Aristotle, having successfully
emasculated the concept of mimesis by reducing it to a motivational or
foundational role, or descriptive of a process, has been repeatedly thrust
into the role of being father to a tradition he did so much to disavow and
reform. His real (though unrecognized) accomplishment was to have redirected critical theory to the issue of artistic transformation- how representation restructuresour experiences of reality, not how art parallelsreality. It
is from his perception of this uniqueness of the aesthetic experience that
Aristotle infers the uniqueness of the work itself. In specific opposition to
Plato's demand that art serve a referential function, Aristotle poses the
objection that fundamental to the nature of representation are particular
featureswe experience in a manner quite incongruouswith our lived experience of the world itself. The work of art and the world it embodies are thus
recognized to exist for us in a manner quite unlike the way autonomous
objects exist. Aristotle does not pursue this insight. The investigation of
the unique ontology and phenomenology of the work of art would not begin
in earnest until the eighteenth century. But Aristotle does lay the foundation for its consideration as an object of a peculiar kind.
The pertinent question now raised is, How does the literary medium
necessarily modify our experience we call aesthetic? It is, in fact, this line
of questioning that will ultimately be pursued to the final collapse of
mimesis in the eighteenth century. Beginning with the revolt against
Cartesian linguistics in the seventeenth century (and its ideal of a pure,
transparentlanguage) and culminating in the work of the pre-Romantics,
the essential constant of the mimetic paradigmwill again be perceived as
the degree of likeness to a model attainable through art, and not the
model itself. And, in the writings of Descartes, Vico, Diderot, Shelley,
and their contemporaries, the critique of mimesis will but elaborate Aristotle's fundamental insight into the limits of semblance imposed by a
representational medium.30
University of Richmond
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NOTES
1. See R. G. Collingwood, "Plato's Philosophy of Art," Mind 34 (1925): 154-72; and
Allan Gilbert, "Did Plato Ban the Poets or the Critics," Studiesin Philology36 (1939): 119. Most of these attempts to rehabilitate Plato's tarnished reputation among poets presuppose an enlightened understanding of art's exemption from extra-literary standards which
was vouchsafed to Plato, but which he would not deign to share with an audience blinded
by naive, didactic expectations. Such readings are generally tautological (since they presume but never substantiate the presence in Plato of that modern aesthetic sensibility
which is itself the source of our repugnance to Plato's ban). See, for example, John Boyd's
criticism in The Functionof Mimesisand its Decline, 2nd ed. (New York:FordhamUP, 1980)
16-17.
2. The most extreme example of this position seems to be J. G. Warry, who believes
that "any attempt to credit Plato's discussion of art in the Republicwith an intelligent basis
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